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Abstract: We investigate the nature of market failure in a dynamic version of Akerlof
(1970) where identical cohorts of a durable good enter the market over time.  In the
dynamic model, equilibria with qualitatively different properties emerge.  Typically, in
equilibria of the dynamic model, sellers with higher quality wait in order to sell and
wait more than sellers of lower quality.  Among other things, we show  for any
distribution of quality that there exist an infinite number of cyclical equilibria where all
goods are traded within a certain number of periods after entering the market.
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1. Introduction
Since the pioneering work of Akerlof (1970) many economists have studied the market
failures due to asymmetric information in an otherwise perfectly competitive market.
The standard model studies a static market with atomistic agents whose valuations
depend on quality and a standard result is that only low quality goods are traded (if at
all) even if the buyers are willing to pay more than the reservation price of sellers for
each individual quality (see also, Wilson, 1979, 1980).  This so-called lemons problem
affects a large spectrum of markets, including insurance markets.  In many cases,
including the classic second-hand car market, the good under consideration is a durable
good.
Durability introduces two complicating factors in the used goods markets: goods
not traded in any period can be offered for sale in the future and, in addition, new
cohorts of potential sellers may enter the market over time.  Janssen and Roy (1999a,
1999b) have investigated some of the issues that arise when durability is explicitly
taken into account in a dynamic model.  Janssen and Roy (1999a) address the issue
whether a  given stock of goods can be traded over time.  They show that in any
dynamic competitive equilibrium all goods eventually will be traded.  The main idea
behind this result is that low quality sellers have less incentives to wait (before selling)
compared to high quality sellers.  Once certain (low) qualities are sold, only relatively
high qualities remain in the market.  Consumers can predict that sellers of different
qualities will sort themselves into different time periods and, hence, they are willing to
pay higher prices in later periods.  The equilibrium is thus one in which higher
qualities are sold in later periods at higher prices.
Janssen and Roy (1999b) address the same issue in the context of markets where
identical cohorts of goods with uniformly distributed quality enter the market over time.
In such markets, the infinite repetition of the static equilibrium under adverse selection
is an equilibrium in the dynamic model.  In fact, it is the unique stationary equilibrium
and also the only equilibrium where prices and average quality traded are (weakly)
monotonic over time.  They show that there exists at least one other equilibrium,
however, where all goods are traded within finite time after they have entered the3
market.  These equilibria are cyclical in prices and quantities in the sense that once all
goods are traded, prices (and quantities) will fall.  Up to the moment all goods are sold,
however, the dynamic process of prices and quantities is monotonically increasing.
In this paper we extend the analysis of Janssen and Roy (1999b) in a number of
ways.  First, we relax the assumption that in every period a cohort of  uniformly
distributed qualities enters the market.  Instead, we allow for any arbitrary distribution,
which satisfies some mild regularity condition.  Second, our results are stronger in the
sense that we show the existence of an infinite number of equilibria, where all goods are
traded within finite time after they have entered the market.  Finally, we show the
extent to which the uniform distribution is special.  It turns out that for a set of values
of the model's parameters and a set of distributions, which have relatively little
probability mass in the neighborhood of the static equilibrium, it is impossible to
construct a dynamic equilibrium with monotonically increasing prices and quantities
up to the moment everything is sold.  We provide an example  where this is the case.
Hence, the equilibrium construction for the uniform distribution does not extend
naturally to the class of all distributions.
Other existing literature
1 on adverse selection has focused on various processes
(such as signaling and screening) through which the difficulties of trading under
asymmetric information may be resolved and has emphasized the role of non-market
institutions in this context (such as certification intermediaries and leasing).  This
paper, in contrast, is motivated by a more basic issue which also underlies the original
Akerlof paper viz., the functioning of the price mechanism in a perfectly competitive
market when traders have private information.  It is important to understand the nature
of market failures due to adverse selection before analyzing the role of institutions in
mitigating these failures.
Our specific model is as follows.  We consider a competitive market for a
perfectly durable good where potential sellers are privately informed about the quality
of the goods they own.  Each period, a cohort of sellers of equal size and with an
identical, but arbitrary, distribution of quality enters the market.  The demand side is4
modeled in the following simple way.  Buyers are identical, have unit demand and for
any given quality, a buyer’s willingness to pay exceeds the reservation price of a seller
for that quality.  As buyers do not know the quality, their willingness to pay in a period
equals the expected valuation of goods traded in that period.  Moreover, there are more
buyers than sellers in each period so that in equilibrium, prices equal the expected
valuation.  Once traded, goods are not re-sold in the same market.
2
The Akerlof-Wilson model can be considered the static version of our model.  The
adverse selection problem implies that in equilibrium only a certain range of low
qualities is traded.  The infinitely repeated version of a static equilibrium outcome is
also an equilibrium in our dynamic model.  Hence, the issue of existence of dynamic
equilibria is easily resolved.  In this dynamic equilibrium high quality goods remain
unsold forever.
We concentrate on the existence of other equilibria with more interesting
properties - where prices and average quality traded fluctuate over time.  We provide a
characterization result saying that in all such equilibria the range of quality, which is
eventually traded in the market, exceeds that in the stationary (static) outcome.
Moreover, sellers of different qualities within each cohort of entrants separate
themselves out over time.  As the use value of low quality goods is lower than that of
high quality goods, low quality sellers sell earlier than high quality sellers, the owner
of a good with lower quality trades earlier, owners of higher quality goods wait longer.
In order to highlight the waiting aspect of the adverse selection problem and also to
make clear the sharp contrast between the properties of equilibria of our model with
those of the static model, the main part of the analysis is devoted to proving the
existence of an infinite number of equilibrium where every potential seller entering the
market trades within a certain finite number of periods after entering the market.
The results obtained in the paper provide a different perspective on the adverse
selection problem.  In the static Akerlof-Wilson model, the adverse selection problem
                                                                                                                                
1  See, for instance, Guha and Waldman (1997), Hendel and Lizzeri (1999a,b), Lizzeri (1999) and
Waldman, (1999).
2  Our analysis bears some resemblance to that by Sobel (1991) of a durable goods monopoly where new
cohorts of consumers enter the market over time.  Unlike our framework, there is no correlation between
the valuations of buyers and sellers in his model.5
manifests itself in the fact that relatively high quality goods cannot be traded despite
the potential gains from trade.  In the dynamic market for durable goods, the lemons
problem is not so much the impossibility of trading relatively high quality goods, but
rather that sellers with relatively high quality goods need to wait longer in order to
trade.
3  So, the cost of waiting becomes an important factor in the welfare loss arising
due to asymmetric information.
There are three important intertemporal factors in the market which determine the
market dynamics in all the non-stationary equilibria of our model.  First, once a certain
range of quality is traded, only sellers of higher quality goods are left in the market,
which tends to improve the distribution of quality of potentially tradable goods in the
future.  Second, the entry of a new cohort of potential sellers with goods of all possible
quality dilutes the average quality of potentially tradable goods - as they cannot be
distinguished by buyers from higher quality sellers left over from the past.  Finally, as
time progresses and stocks of untraded goods accumulate from the past, the new cohort
of traders entering the market in any period becomes increasingly less significant in
determining the distribution of quality of tradable goods.
4
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 sets out the model, the equilibrium
concept and some preliminary results.  Section 3 provides a characterization result.
The main result of the paper relating to the existence of an infinite number of equilibria
where all goods are traded within finite time after entry into the market are outlined in
section 4.  Section 5 concludes.  Proofs are contained in the Appendix.
                                               
3  There are certain situations in which the fact that a seller has waited for a long time might indicate low
rather than high quality.  This would be true, for example, when the buyers can inspect quality - high
valuation buyers are more likely to inspect and select the relatively high quality houses - leaving unsold
goods of relatively low quality for later periods (Taylor, 1998).  A paper with a similar spirit is that of
Vettas (1997).  As stated earlier, our model is designed to understand the nature of the lemons problem
and so we do not allow for any technology which can directly modify the information structure.
4  If there is no entry of sellers after the initial period, or equivalently, if buyers can distinguish the
period of entry of sellers in the market, then only the first factor is relevant.  In that case, it has been
shown earlier for fairly general distributions of quality (see, Janssen and Roy (1998)) that in every
equilibrium all goods are traded in finite time.  Vincent (1990) analyzes a dynamic auction game with
similar features.6
2. Model.
Consider a Walrasian market for a perfectly durable good whose quality, denoted by
q , varies between q  and q , where  ¥ < < < q q 0 .  Time is discrete and is indexed by






t I I  and  i t  is the period of entry of seller  I i˛ .  Each seller is endowed
with one unit of the durable good of quality  i q .  Let the total Lebesgue measure of
sellers from the set  t I  who own a good of quality less than or equal to q  be a function
{ } ( ) ( ) q m q q m ” £ ˛ i t I i i , , which is independent of t.  We assume that  ( ) q m  is strictly
increasing and absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure.
The measure of all sellers who enter the market in each period is strictly positive,
so  ( ) 0 > q m .  Each seller  i knows the quality  i q  of the good he is endowed with and
derives flow utility from ownership of the good until he sells it.  Therefore, the seller's
reservation price is the discounted sum of gross surplus due to ownership and we
assume that it is exactly equal to  i q .  So, the per period gross surplus is ( ) i q d - 1 .
Each time period  t a set of buyers, with measure larger than  ( ) q m , enters the
market.  All buyers are identical and have unit demand.  A buyer's valuation of quality
q  is equal to  q v , where  1 > v .  Thus, under full information, a buyer's valuation
exceeds the seller's.  All buyers know the ex ante distribution of the sellers with respect
to qualities but do not know the quality of the good offered by a particular seller.
When a buyer buys a good he leaves the market forever.  All players discount the
future with common discount factor d ,  1 0 < < d .  They are risk neutral and rational
agents.
We will denote expected quality of the good from seller i conditional on the fact
that he belongs to a certain subset  I I ￿ ¢  as  { } ( ) I¢ h , this value is defined for all  I I ￿ ¢
such that  { } ( ) 0 > ¢ I m  and it follows that












In order to have an adverse selection problem in the static model we assume
( ) q q < vE , where  ( ) q E  is the unconditional expected quality of all goods,
( ) { } ( ) { } ( ) I I E t h h q = = .  This implies that the static Akerlof-Wilson version of this
model has a largest equilibrium quality, which we will denote by  ( ) q q q , ˛ S :
[ ] { } ( ) { } q q q q h q q
q = ˛ ˛ = , , max i S I i i v .
To simplify our analysis we make the following two assumptions.  Throughout
this paper, we assume that these assumptions hold.  Basically assumptions 2.1 and 2.2
assure that the distribution of quality is sufficiently well-behaved for some left-
neighborhood of  S q .
Assumption 2.1.  Let  ( ) q m  be a strictly increasing and absolutely continuous with
respect to Lebesgue measure on  [ ] q e q m, - S  for some  0 > m e .  Moreover let  m m M m , $
such that for any  q q ¢ ¢ ¢, ,  q q q e q m £ ¢ ¢ < ¢ £ - S :  ( ) ( )
( )
m m q q
q m q m
M m <
¢ - ¢ ¢
¢ - ¢ ¢
< < 0 .
Assumption 2.2.  The measure function  ( ) q m  is a differentiable function at  S q q =  and







Given a sequence of market prices  { }
¥
= = 1 t t p p  each seller  i chooses whether or not to
sell and if he chooses to sell, the time period in which to sell.  If he chooses not to sell
his gross surplus is equal to  i q  and therefore his net surplus equals to zero, while if he
decides to sell in period  i t t ‡  his gross surplus is
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) t
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and, therefore, his net surplus equals
( ) ( )
i i i t t
i t i t
t t t t
i i p p s
- - - - = - + - = d q q d d q 1 .
The set of time periods in which it is optimal to sell for a seller i is given by
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q d q p .8
If  0 < - i t p q  for all  i t t ‡  then  ( ) ˘ = p i T .
Each potential seller  i chooses a time period  i i T ˛ t  in which to sell.  Let
{ } I i i ˛ = t t  be a set of all selling decisions.  We will denote a set of the sellers who
chose time period  t for trade as  t J , and it follows that  { } t I i J i t = ˛ ” t .  This
generates a certain distribution of qualities over all time periods and the expected
quality of the goods offered for sale in time period t is  { } ( ) t t J h h =  when  { } ( ) 0 > t J m .
In the sections that follow we will use the following notation:
a)  ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1, - - - = t t t t q m q m q q m , so that for all  ¥ < £ £ - - t t m q q e q 1 S   ( ) t t q q m , 1 -  is
the measure of sellers from  t I  whose goods are of quality from the range
[ ] t t q q , 1 - :  ( ) [ ] { } ( ) t t t t q q q m q q m , , , 1 1 - - ˛ ˛ = i t I i i  and  ( ) ( ) t t t t q q m q q m , , 1 1 - - - = ;
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so that for all  q q q e q t t m £ £ £ - -1 S ,  ( ) t t q q h , 1 -  is the expected quality of goods
from sellers who belong to  t I  whose goods are of quality from the range [ ] t t q q , 1 - :
( ) [ ] { } ( ) t t t t q q q h q q h , , , 1 1 - - ˛ ˛ = i t I i i , and  ( ) ( ) t t t t q q h q q h , , 1 1 - - = .
The following lemma states the continuity of  ( ) t t q q h , 1 - .
Lemma  2.1.   For all  q q q e q t t m £ £ £ - -1 S  the function  ( ) t t q q h , 1 -  is a strictly
increasing continuous function.  Moreover,  h h M m , $ , such that
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On the equilibrium path, buyers' expectations of quality in a period where a
strictly positive measure of goods is offered for sale must equal the expected quality in
that time period.  As all buyers are identical, we assume that their expectations of
quality in period t are symmetric and denoted by  t E .9
A dynamic equilibrium is an equilibrium where all players rationally maximize
their objectives, expectations are fulfilled and markets clear in every period.
Definition 2.1.  A dynamic equilibrium is described in terms of: a sequence of prices
{ }
¥
= = 1 t t p p , a set of selling decision  { } I i i ˛ = t t  and a sequence of buyers' quality
expectations  { }
¥
= = 1 t t E E  such that:
a)  Seller maximize:  ( ) p i i T ˛ t  for all I i˛ , i.e., seller  i chooses time period  i t  to
trade optimally.
b)  Buyers maximize and market clear: If  { } ( ) 0 > t J m  then  t t vE p = , i.e., if there is
a strictly positive amount of trade in time period t, then each buyer earns zero net
surplus so that he is indifferent between buying and not buying and market clears.
If  { } ( ) 0 = t J m  then  t t vE p ‡ , i.e., if zero measure of trade occurs in time period t
then each buyer can earn at most zero net surplus.  Hence, not buying is optimal
for him in that period.
c)  Expectations are fulfilled when trade occurs: If  { } ( ) 0 > t J m  then  t t E h = .
d)  Expectations are reasonable even if no trade occurs: For all t  q ‡ t E .
Given the set-up described above, conditions (a)-(c) are quite standard, condition
(d) says that even in periods in which (at most) zero measure of seller intends to sell,
buyers' beliefs should be reasonable.  This condition assures that autarky, i.e., no trade
in any period, cannot be sustained in an equilibrium of the dynamic model.  Given the
condition, the willingness to pay, hence the price in any period, is restricted from
below by  q v  and sellers with low enough qualities prefer to sell against this price
rather than not sell.
3. Characterization of equilibrium.
We start the analysis characterizing the properties of any dynamic equilibrium.  In the
Proposition 3.1 below we first argue that if a good of certain quality sells in period t,
then all goods with lower qualities that have entered the market in and before period t10
will also sell in that period.  This fact allows us to define for each period a marginal
seller  t q  as the seller of the highest quality in period t.  It also allows us to define  t s  as
the surplus of the marginal seller in period  t, i.e.,  t t t p s q - = .  This part of the
Proposition 3.1 basically follows from the fact that the use value of low qualities is
lower than the use value of high qualities so that low qualities are more ready to sell.
The second part of the Proposition 3.1 argues that the marginal sellers in any
period make non-negative net surplus.  This implies that the other sellers make strictly
positive surplus.
The third part of the Proposition 3.1 argues that the marginal seller in period t is
indifferent between selling in period t and selling in the first future period in which a
quality larger than his own quality is sold.  Prices in that future period will be higher,
reflecting higher average quality, but the discounted surplus is such that the seller is
indifferent.
The last part of the Proposition 3.1 says that if it exists the highest quality that will
ever be sold in any dynamic equilibrium is either equal to q  or it is such that the seller
makes zero surplus.  It is clear that if a seller makes zero net surplus, prices in all
future periods cannot be higher as this seller will have an incentive to wait and sell in
that future period.  The Proposition 3.1 argues that if the highest quality sold in a
dynamic equilibrium makes strictly positive surplus, then it must be equal to q .
Proposition 3.1 (equilibrium characterization).  Any dynamic equilibrium has the
following properties.
a)  For all t  [ ] q q q , ˛ $ t  such that if  q q > t  then  [ ] { } t t i J i t i t £ ˛ = , ,q q q , i.e., in every
period t in which strictly positive amount of trade occurs the set of quality traded
is a range [ ] t q q, , where  t q  is the marginal quality traded in period t.  All sellers
who are in the market by period  t and own goods of quality not larger than  t q
prefer to trade in this time period.
b)  t t p q ‡ .11
c)  Let  ( ) { } t t t t q q t t t > =
> min ~ , i.e.,  ( ) t t ~  is the first period after t where  t q qt > .  Then
( )
( ) ( ) t t t
t t t




, i.e., marginal seller in period  t is just indifferent
between selling in that period and in the first next period where marginal quality is
larger than his own quality.











t t max arg min ˆ  then  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 ˆ ˆ ˆ = - - t t t t t t p q q q , i.e., if in period  tˆ the
marginal quality is the first largest one for all subsequent periods then either this is
the highest possible quality q  or the surplus of the corresponding marginal seller
is zero.
It is easily seen that the infinitely repeated outcome of the static model is a
dynamic equilibrium of our model.  Hence, existence of equilibrium is not really an
issue here.  We will show that in the dynamic model there are infinitely many other
equilibria, each one starting from a certain neighborhood of a static equilibrium
quality.
4. Equilibria Trading all Goods.
We will now show that for any measure function  ( ) q m  which satisfies Assumptions
2.1-2.2 and for all generic values of the parameters  v,  d , q  and q  there exist an
infinite number of dynamic equilibria covering all qualities up to q .  As we already
know that our model has at least one equilibrium, a general existence proof is trivial.
That is why we use a constructive proof showing how to find an equilibrium sequence
of marginal qualities that is such that all qualities up to q  are traded.  The fact that
there are infinitely many dynamic equilibria follows from the fact that if there exists a
dynamic equilibrium covering all qualities up to q  starting from some  S q q < 1 , then
there also exists a dynamic equilibrium covering all qualities up to q  starting from a
'
1 q , with  S q q q < <
'
1 1 .12
Before we will go into the details of the analysis, we first introduce an important
parameter.  Assumption 2.2 allows us to define a parameter  a, which describes the
relation between the distribution of quality over the range  [ ] S q q,  and the marginal
distribution at  S q  itself:



















= - ” .
Obviously,  a is strictly positive.  We will now argue that generically, it must be
that  1 < a .  To this end, consider the surplus of the marginal seller in the static model
as a function of q :
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) q q m q
q m
q q h q q q
q
q
- = - = - ” ￿ d v v p s
1
, and
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1
1






















Thus, the surplus of the marginal seller can be written as
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) S S S S S S o a o
d
ds
s s q q q q q q q q q
q
q
q q - + - - = - + - + ” 1 . (1)
Suppose then that  1 > a .
5  This would imply that  ( ) 0 > q s  in some right
neighborhood of  S q .  But this contradicts the assumption that  S q  is the highest static
equilibrium quality.
In the uniform case, we have  v a 2
1 =
6.  As in the uniform case adverse selection
implies that  2 1 < < v , the uniform distribution is a special case of the case when
( ) 1 , 2
1 ˛ a .  In subsection 4.1 we will start with this simplest case, which generalizes the
analysis in Janssen and Roy (1999b).  We show that one can construct a "monotonic"
sequence of marginal qualities  t q  that are strictly increasing over time until all goods
are sold.  The main reason why the case  ( ) 1 , 2
1 ˛ a  is to be distinguished from other
cases can be seen by looking at equation (1).  If we choose  S q q = 1 , then in the second
period, the measure of qualities just above  S q  that are not yet sold is two times as high
                                               
5  The case where  1 = a  is a non-generic case.13
as the original measure.  If  ( ) 1 , 2
1 ˛ a , the distribution of qualities in the second period is
such that a new "static" equilibrium emerges that is larger than  S q .  As in the second
period we can write  ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) S S S S o a a s q q q q q q q q q - - + - - - - = 1 2 1 2 2 , 1 2  it
possible to choose  1 q  close enough to  S q  such that  1 2 q q >  and  0 2 > s .
If  2
1 < a , it may not be possible to construct such a "monotonic" equilibrium and
we show this by example.  In subsection  4.2 we show that dynamic equilibria
nevertheless exist if  ( ) ( ) d a a ~ , 0 ˛ , where  ( ) d a ~  is some decreasing function of d .  The
kind of equilibrium we obtain is not monotonic, however, and marginal qualities  t q
strictly decrease for some initial time periods after which they strictly increase until all
goods are sold.  The general theorem is provided in subsection  4.3.  As the
construction here becomes quite complicated, subsections 4.1 and 4.2 are also provided
for didactical reasons.
The construction of equilibrium uses an "equilibrium sequence" which is defined
below.
Definition  4.1.   An equilibrium sequence  ( ) U T Q  is a finite sequence of marginal
qualities  t q  as functions of  1 q , the latter being defined over some range  ( ) 1 1,q q = U ,
i.e.,  ( ) ( ) { }
T
t t T U 1 1 = = Q q q , such that all equilibrium conditions in Definition 2.1 hold for
all  1 , , 1 - = T t K .  Moreover, for all  U ˛ 1 q :
a)  ( ) 1 q qt  is continuous for all  T t , , 1K = ;
b)  ( ) ( ) 1 1 q q q q t T >  for all  1 , , 1 - = T t K ;
c)  ( ) 1 q h t t t p v p = = , the price in period t is continuous and  ( ) S S t p q q = ;
d)  ( ) ( ) 1 1 q q q t t p >  for all  T t , , 1K = , i.e., the price in period  t exceeds the marginal
quality in that period and  ( ) 0 1 > q t s ;
                                                                                                                                
6  This easily follows from the fact that  q q v
v
S - = 2  and  ( ) ( ) q q q m - = S S f .14
e)  for all  1 , , 1 - = T t K   ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) t t t
t t t




, where  ( ) { } t T t t t q q t t t > =
£ < min ~ , i.e.,
the marginal seller in period t is just indifferent between selling in that period and
in the first next period where marginal quality is larger than his own quality.
7
The above definition does not imply the existence of an equilibrium sequence.
However, it easy to see that there exists at least one equilibrium sequence, namely
( ) ( ) { } 1 1 , q q e q m = - Q S S , such that all mentioned above conditions are trivially satisfied.
The main property of an equilibrium sequence we use is that if there is a dynamic
equilibrium with marginal qualities { }
¥
=1 t t q  such that for  T , , 1K = t  it can be described
by a certain equilibrium sequence  ( ) ( ) { }
T
t t T U 1 1 = = Q q q , then there is only one
indifference equation, namely
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) T T t
T T t





which relates prices  t p  and marginal qualities  t q  for  ¥ + = K , 1 T t  to prices  t p  and
marginal qualities  t q  for  T , , 1K = t  (this follows from (b) above).  Intuitively,  T q
summarizes all the relevant properties of the sequence of marginal qualities up to time
period  T .  Our purpose, therefore, is to find an equilibrium sequence such that
( ) q q q = 1 T  for some T  and  1 q .
4.1 The case where  2
1 > a .
In this subsection we prove the existence of an increasing sequence 
T
t t 1 } { = q , where
q q = T  when  2
1 > a .  As the uniform distribution is a special case, the result obtained in
this section show to what extent the results obtained in Janssen and Roy (1999b) can be
generalized to allow for other types of distribution functions.  The following theorem
contains a statement of the formal result.
                                               
7  That minimum always exists as at least one 
t q  is above 
t q , namely 
t T q q > .15
Theorem 4.1.  For any  ( ) 1 , 2
1 ˛ a  and for any generic value of q , there exist an infinite
number of dynamic equilibria such that all goods are sold in finite time after entering
the market.
The proof consists of three steps.  In Proposition 4.1 we prove that it is possible to
construct an equilibrium sequence of an arbitrary length where marginal qualities { } t q
are strictly increasing and very close to the static equilibrium quality  S q .  Under these
circumstances the main indifference equation (2) takes the following form:
( ) t t t t p p q d q - = - +1 . (3)
In other words, the marginal seller in period t is just indifferent between selling in
that period and in the next period.  We will denote such monotonic equilibrium
sequences as  ( ) U
1 Q  and call a dynamic equilibrium, which is based on them, as
"dynamic equilibrium of type I".
Proposition 4.1.  If  ( ) 1 , 2
1 ˛ a , then there exist an infinite number of  ( ) U
1 Q .  Moreover,
g e $ ,  0 T $  such that for all  0 T t >   ( ) ( ) S t t U q q ,
0
1
0 = $  and  ( )
0 1
t t U Q $  such that:
a)  for all  t , , 1K = t   ( ) 1 q qt  is differentiable at  S q q = 1  and  ( ) S S q q qt = ;
b)  for all 
0
1 t U ˛ q   ( ) ( ) 1
1
1 0 q e q q q d g t S t s < - < .
Proposition 4.1 implies that if  ( ) 1 , 2
1 ˛ a , we can construct an equilibrium sequence
of an arbitrarily long length t such that in period  1 + t  there will be more sellers with
high quality ( S i q q > ) goods than the number of sellers with low quality ( S i q q < ).
This allows us to expand the equilibrium sequence  t Q  for some more periods.
Next, in  Proposition 4.2, we prove that when we are able to construct an
equilibrium sequence of an arbitrary length where all marginal qualities belong to a
certain neighborhood of  S q , then we can expand it in such a way that the surplus of the
last marginal quality  t q  could be made any value between 0 and  ( ) t v q 1 - .  More
precisely, given any equilibrium sequence  t Q  with  ( ) ( ) 1
1
1 0 q e q q q d g t S t s < - <  we can
construct another sequence  t¢ Q , where  t t > ¢ , such that  t t ¢ Q ￿ Q  and  ( ) 1 q t p  covers the16
whole interval  ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 , q q q q t t v .  The conditions under which the Proposition 4.2 holds
are the same as the conclusion reached in Proposition 4.1.  This is done as in later
subsections we will also make use of it.




and  ( )
0
t t U Q $  such that for all 
0
1 t U ˛ q   ( ) ( ) 1
1
1 q e q q q d g t S t s < - , then for any  0 > S e  and
0 > q e   S T $  such that for all  S T t ‡   ( ) ( )
0
1 , t S
S S
t U t U ￿ = $ q q  and  ( )
S
t t U Q $  such that:
a)  for any 
S
t U ˛ 1 q   ( ) q e q q q < - S t 1 ;
b)  ( ) 0 = S t s q ;




t v s e q q q - - > 1 1 1 .
Proposition 4.2 tells us that if we could trade goods for many time periods and,
therefore, accumulate "high quality sellers", then we can organize trade in such a way
that in the last time period of the equilibrium sequence "almost" all sellers who prefer
to sell in that period will have goods of quality very close to  S q .
Finally, in Proposition 4.3 we prove that if we are able to trade goods along an
equilibrium path from a certain range of qualities such that the price in the last period
of the equilibrium sequence can be made any value between the marginal quality and
buyer's valuations of the marginal quality, then we can expand that equilibrium
sequence in such a way that wider range of qualities could be traded with the same
properties.  Doing so, after a finite number of iterations we generically can construct an
equilibrium sequence where  q q = t , i.e., all goods are traded by the period t.
Proposition 4.3.  If  ( ) [ ) q q q , S
k ˛ $  such that for any  0 > S e  and  0 > q e   ( ) k
S T $  such that
for all  ( ) k
S T t >   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) k t k t U
k
t , , , 1 1 q q = $
8 and  ( ) ( )
k
t t U Q $  such that:
a)  for all  ( ) k
t U ˛ 1 q   ( ) ( )
q e q q q < -
k
t 1 ;
                                               
8  Here we don't make a distinction between  1 1 q q <  and  1 1 q q > .  All we need is  ( ) k
t U  to be a nonempty
open set while  1 q  and  1 q  are its boundary points.17
b)  ( ) ( ) S t k t s e q < £ , 0 1 ;
c)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) S t t k t v k t s e q q q - - > , 1 , 1 1 ;
then either
a)  0 > $ S e  such that for any T   T t > $ ,  ( ) t 1
~
q $  and  ( ) 1
~
q
t Q $  such that  ( ) q q q = 1
~
t  and
( ) S t s e q > 1
~
, or
b)  for any  0 > S e  and  0 > q e   ( ) ( ) ( ] q q q , ˆ ˆ 1 k k v ˛ $
+  and  ( ) 1 + $
k
S T  such that for all  ( ) 1 + >
k
S T t
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) k
t
k
t U k t k t U ￿ + + = $
+ 1 , , 1 , 1 1
1 q q  and  ( ) ( )
1 + Q $
k
t t U  such that:




t U q   ( ) ( )





•  ( ) ( ) S t k t s e q < + £ 1 , 0 1 ;
•  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) S t t k t v k t s e q q q - + - > + 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 .
Proposition 4.3 basically says that if we have constructed an equilibrium sequence
for a sufficiently large number of periods, then we can either make sure that after some
more time periods the next marginal quality can be chosen relatively far from the
present marginal quality and such that all desirable properties are kept (case (b)) or we
can reach q  (case (a)).
Propositions 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 taken together give us a large part of the proof of
Theorem 4.1.
4.2 The case of small a and d .
In this section, we construct an equilibrium sequence for the case when a and d small.
We first provide an example showing why the analysis of the previous subsection does
not continue to be valid.  The example shows that when a and d are small there does
not exist a  1 2 q q >  such that  0 2 ‡ s  and such that  1 q  is indifferent between selling in
period 1 and selling in period 2.18
Example 4.1 Let us take  2 . 1 = v ,  1 . 0 = d ,  10 = q ,  13 = q  and a measure function











q 1 , 10   if        , 1




The static equilibrium quality for this case is unique and equals  12.31   5 . 151 » = S q .
In any dynamic equilibrium we must have  [ ] S q q q , 1 ˛  (otherwise we would have
0 1 < s ).  The following picture 4.1 shows the graph of functions  ( ) 1 2 2 X X q =  and












X2 S2 Static quality
Figure 4.1.
It is easy to see that for any value of  1 q  we get  ( ) 1 2 q q  above  S q  and the surplus in
the second period is negative. //
We will now prove that if a is relatively small, particularly if  ( ) ( )
2 1 , 0 d - ˛ a , then
we are still able to construct infinitely many dynamic equilibria such that all goods
from the range  [ ] q q,  are traded.  The equilibrium sequence is non-monotonic.  Note
that the parameter configuration analyzed here partially overlaps with the parameter
configuration analyzed in the previous subsection.  The result we will prove is formally
stated in Theorem 4.2 below.19
Theorem 4.2.  For any  ( )
2 ) 1 ( , 0 d - ˛ a , and for any generic value of q , there exist an
infinite number of dynamic equilibria such that all goods are sold in finite time after
entering the market.
In order to prove this theorem we only need to show that when  ( )
2 ) 1 ( , 0 d - ˛ a  it
is also possible to construct an equilibrium sequence of an arbitrary large length  t
where marginal qualities  { } t q  are very close to the static equilibrium quality  S q .  We
will construct a sequence that is strictly decreasing for some time,  t t q q < +1 , and only
the last marginal quality  T q  exceeds all previous ones.  We denote such a sequence as
"equilibrium sequences of type II" and write  ( ) U
2 Q .
In this case our indifference equation (2) becomes the following system:
( ) t
t
t t q d q - = -
-
t
t p p ,  t , , 1K = t . (4)
Proposition 4.4.  If  ( ) 2 ) 1 ( , 0 d - ˛ a , then there exist an infinite number of  ( ) U
2 Q .
Moreover,  g e $ ,  0 T $  such that for all  0 T t >   ( ) ( ) S t t U q q ,
0
1
0 = $  and  ( )
0 2
t t U Q $  such that:
a)  for all  t , , 1K = t   ( ) 1 q qt  is differentiable at  S q q = 1  and  ( ) S S q q qt = ;
b)  for all 
0
1 t U ˛ q   ( ) ( ) 1
1
1 0 q e q q q d g t S t s < - < .
Note that the conclusions reached in  Proposition 4.4 are identical to the
conclusions reached in Proposition 4.1 so that we can make use of Propositions 4.2 and
4.3 to get the proof of Theorem 4.2.
4.3 The General case.
Finally, we prove that for any value of  a, we are able to construct infinitely many
dynamic equilibria such that all goods in  [ ] q q,  are traded.  The structure of the
corresponding equilibrium sequences becomes a mixture of the equilibrium sequences
of type I and type II.20
Theorem 4.3.  For any generic value of q , there exist an infinite number of dynamic
equilibria such that all goods are sold in finite time after entering the market.
Again, like in subsection 4.2, the only thing we need to prove is that it is possible
to construct an equilibrium sequence of an arbitrary large length where marginal
qualities { } t q  are very close to the static equilibrium quality  S q .  This is the content of
Proposition 4.5.
Proposition 4.5.  There exist an infinite number of  ( ) U Q .  Moreover, there exist some
numbers  g e ,  0 T  and  1 ‡ m k  such that for all  0 T t >   ( ) ( ) S m tk tk U




1 + = $ +  and
( )
0
1 1 + + Q $
m m tk tk U  such that:
a)  for all  1 , , 1 + = m tk K t   ( ) 1 q qt  is differentiable at  S q q = 1  and  ( ) S S q q qt = ;
b)  for all 
0
1 1 + ˛
m tk U q   ( ) ( ) 1 1
1
1 1 0 q e q q q d g + + < - <
m m tk S tk s .
The main difference with related Propositions  4.1 and  4.4 is that here the
equilibrium sequence constructed around  S q  is partly composed of increasing
subsequences and partly composed of decreasing subsequences.  Therefore, we need to
indices (t and  m k ) to keep track of the whole equilibrium sequence.
Note that the conclusions reached in  Proposition 4.5 are identical to the
conclusions reached in Proposition 4.1 so that we can make use of Propositions 4.2 and
4.3 to get the proof of Theorem 4.3.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have provided a different perspective on the way the adverse selection
problem may manifest itself in durable good markets, where entry takes place in the
same market.  In the static Akerlof-Wilson model, adverse selection results in high
quality goods not being able to trade despite the potential gains from trade.  The
infinite repetition of this static equilibrium is also an equilibrium in the dynamic model
where a durable good is traded in a competitive market.  Our main result in this paper,21
however, says that there are infinitely many other equilibria where all goods are sold
within finite time after entering the market.  In each of these dynamic equilibria, the
marginal quality that is sold in the first period lies in a small neighborhood of the static
equilibrium.  This result holds true for all generic values of the parameters governing
the behavior of buyers and sellers and the distribution of qualities in the population of
sellers.
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Appendix.
From now on we will use the following notation.
a)  ( ) ( )
( ) 1







t t t t
t q q
q q h q q h
K ; (5)












c)  1 - - = t t t q q y ; (7)
d)  1 - - = t t t y y z ; (8)
e)  t d t g s
1 = ;
f)  ( )
( ) ( )





















  if   , 1 lim
  if   , , 1
; (9)
g)  ( )
[ ]







h)  ( ) 1 1 1 1 - - - - - = t t t v g q j . (10)23
Proof of Lemma 2.1 is on request. ¦
Proof of Proposition 3.1.  We prove all statements of the proposition sequentially.
a)  Let us take any period t of positive amount of trade  t J  so that  ( ) 0 > t J m  and take
any  t J i˛ .  By the definition of dynamic equilibrium we can write:



















i t p p
- - - ‡ -
t
t d q d q  for all  i t t ‡ > t .  Now take any  i q q < :
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( ) . 0 1 > - - ‡
‡ - - + - - - = - - -
- -
- - - - -
i










t p p p p
d d q q






So, for all sellers with a good of quality less then  i q  who are still in the market in
a certain period and have not yet traded it is optimal to trade in that period.  Thus,
we can define  t q  as  { } t i
i
t J i˛ = q q sup  and then it is easy to see that
[ ] { } t t i J i t i t £ ˛ = , ,q q q .  Finally, if  0 ) ( = t J m  for some t, then we set  q q = t .
b)  By the equilibrium definition, for all  t  q ‡ t E  and  t t vE p ‡  so that  q v pt ‡ .
Thus, if  ( ) 0 = t J m , we have  t t v p q q q = > ‡ .  If  ( ) 0 > t J m , it is optimal for the
marginal seller  t q  to trade in period  t and a necessary condition is  0 ‡ - t t p q .
So,  t t p q ‡  for all t.
c)  Suppose  ( )( ) 0 ~
~
> = - - -
- s q d q t t
t t
t t p p .  Then, we can find a seller  i of quality
s q q 2
1 + = t i  such that  t i t ~ q q q < <  and  t ti £ , i.e., he is in the market by period t.
By definition of { } t q  he will trade in period t ~ .  But it can be shown that this is not
optimal:
( ) ( ) ( )










< - + - = + - - + -




t t i i i p p d s s d s q d s q d .
So, it is not possible that  ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) t t t
t t t




.  A similar argument shows
that it is impossible to have  ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) t t t
t t t





d)  Suppose  0 ˆ > = - s q q t .  We will show that in this case  0 ˆ ˆ = - t t p q .  Suppose not.
Then it must be  0 ˆ ˆ > = - e qt t p .  Let us take a seller  i of quality24
{ } s e q q , min 2
1
ˆ + = t i  such that  q q q < < i tˆ  and  t ti ˆ = .  By definition of { } t q  he will
never trade because for all  i t t ‡   { } i t t t t t q q q q < = £
‡
ˆ ˆ max .  If he, however, traded in
period tˆ he would get






ˆ ˆ ˆ > ‡ - = - - = - e s e e s e q q t t i t p p , which is a contradiction.
So, it must be the case that  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 ˆ ˆ ˆ = - - t t t t t t p q q q . ¦
Proof of Proposition 4.1.  Using the fact that  ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 q q q q t t - >  we express the expected
quality sold in period t  in terms of  ( ) t t q q m , 1 -  and  ( ) t t q q h , 1 - :
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 , ,
, , , ,
,
- -





t t t t t t
t t t q q m q q tm
q q m q q h q q m q q th
q q h ,  1 ‡ t ,  q q ” 0 . (11)
Now we consider the indifference condition (3) with  t t h v p = .  It can be written
for  2 ‡ t  as  ( ) ( ) 1
1
1 2 1 1 , , -
-
- - - - = - t d
d
t t t t t t q q h q q h s v . (12)
The main part of the proof is by induction.  At first we will prove that if all
conditions to be proved (except  ( ) S t q q q > 1 ) are true for some  2 > t , then
( ) ( ) 1 1 1 q q q q t t > $ +  such that those conditions are also true for  1 + t .  Next, we will show
that there exist  1 q  and  2 q  such that those conditions are satisfied.  Finally, we will
show that for some  0 T  we get  ( ) S T q q q > 1 0  and, therefore,  ( ) S t q q q > 1  for all  0 T t >  and
all 
0 0
1 0 T t U U ￿ ˛ q .















t p t t q
such that for all 
0
1 1 - ˛ t U q :
a)  ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 q q q q t t - > ,  ( ) 0 1 > q t s ;  ( ) S S q q qt = ,  ( ) 0 = S s q t ;
b)  t q  and  t s  are continuous functions differentiable at  S q q = 1  so that we can write:
( )( ) ( ) S S S S o
d
d





t - + - + = 1 1
1
, and  ( )( ) ( ) S S S o
d
ds
s q q q q q
q
t
t - + - = 1 1
1
;



















d)  for all  2 , , 1 - = t K t   ( ) t t t t q d q - = - +1 p p ;














1 2 - - = .





0 , - ￿ = $ t S t U t U q q  such that for all 
0
1 t U ˛ q  equation
(12) determines a unique value of  t q  as a function of  1 q  and
a)  ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 q q q q - > t t ,  ( ) 0 1 > q t s ;  ( ) S S t q q q = ,  ( ) 0 = S t s q ;
b)  t q  and  t s  are continuous functions differentiable at  S q q = 1  so that we can write:





q q q q q
q
q
q q - + - + = 1 1
1





s q q q q q
q
- + - = 1 1
1
;










































1 2 - - = , and  ( ) ( ) 1 2
2
1 1 - < - a t S t s q q q q .
Let us first consider the left-hand side of the equation  (12) as a function
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 2 1 1 2 1 , , , , - - - - - - - ” t t t t t t t t t t G q q h q q h q q q .  It is easily seen that as  q q q ‡ ‡ - - 2 1 t t
evaluating  ( ) 2 1, , - - t t t t G q q q  at  1 - = t t q q  yields  ( ) 0 , , 2 1 1 £ - - - t t t t G q q q .  So,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1
1




- - - < £ t v t t t t s G  for any 
0
1 1 - ˛ t U q .  Also, for any small
0 > e  such that  q e q < + S ,  ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 , , 2 1 > + - - S t S t S t G q q q q e q .  As
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 , , 1
1
2 1 = > + -
-
- - S t v S t S t S t s G q q q q q e q d
d  and as  ( ) 1 q t G  and  ( ) 1 1 q - t s  are both





0 , - ￿ = t S t U t U q q  such that
for any 
0
1 t U ˛ q   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1
1




- - > + t v t t S t s G .  Finally,  ( ) 2 1, , - - t t t t G q q q  is a
strictly increasing continuous function w.r.t.  t q .
Taking all these facts together and applying the intermediate point theorem we can
draw the following conclusion.  For all 
0
1 t U ˛ q  there exists a unique continuous
function  ( ) 1 q qt  such that  ( ) ( ) e q q q q q + < < - S t t 1 1 1 .   ( ) ( ) t t t t t v s q q q h q - = - , 1 1  is also
continuous function and  ( ) S S t q q q = ,  ( ) 0 = S t s q .26
To prove the rest of step (b) of our induction step, we will now show that  ( ) 1 q qt
and  ( ) 1 q t s  both are differentiable functions at  S q q = 1 .  For all  t , , 2 K = t  the




1 , , -
-
- - - - - = t d
d
t t t d t t t q q q h q q h v .
Taking the first differentials of this identity w.r.t.  1 q  at  S q q = 1 , and using (11), we get:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
,
, , 1
, , , , 1
, ,




2 2 1 2 1 2 1
1 1




- - - - - -
- -





















t t t t t t
d
t t t
t t t t t t
q
q q m q q m t
q q m q q h q q m q q h t
q q m q q tm






S d dS q q t t q q = =
1 .  Taking the derivatives explicitly into account yields
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )



















































q q m q q m t
q t q t
q q h
q q m q q m t
q t q t
q
q q m q q tm
q q q t
q q h
q q m q q tm


















fd fd fd d f d f d f
Rewriting gives
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 - - - - - - - - - = - - t t t t t q d q t q t q t q t d S S S S S d d d a d d a , and
( )( ) ( ) ( ) 2
1
1 2 1 1 -
-
- - - - - + = t
d
t t q t t d q q td S a S S d d d . (13)

































= .  As, by
assumption,  1 - t q  and  2 - t q  both are differentiable at  S q q = 1  so is  ( ) 1 q qt .  Also, as
surplus is defined by  ( ) t t t t t t t v p s q q q h q - = - = -1 , ,  t s  is also differentiable at  S q q = 1 .
Next, we prove part (c) of the induction argument.  To this end, we can rewrite







- - - - - = t
d d
t t q d t td S a
a
a S S d y d y d , and


















t t t td . (14)27

































































Similarly, we can get the following expressions for the first differentials of the
surpluses  t Ss d :
( ) ( ) t t t q t S S S d a y d a s d - - - = 1 1 , and (15)
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 2 1 1 1 - + - = - - - a y d a z d s s d S S S t t t t t . (16)










 and it follows that







































The only parts of the induction argument we still have to prove are











 and for all  t  ( ) ( )
0 0
1
0 , t S t U t U ˛ = $ q q  such that for all 
0
1 t U ˛ q






1 2 - - = .
Subtracting (15) for  1 - t  from (15) for t  we can write
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 1 1 1 1 2 1 - - - - - - - - - = - t t t t t t q q t t S S S S S S d d a y d a y d a s d s d , or
( ) ( ) 1 1 2 1 - - - - - = - t t t t t t y d a y d a s d s d S S S S . (17)
We can write the indifference condition (3) as  ( ) 1 1 - - - + = t t t t q q d ds s , the first
differentials of which w.r.t.  1 q  at  S q q = 1  becomes  t t t d d s d s d y d S S S - = -1 .  Substituting
it into  (17) yields  ( )( ) ( )( ) 1 2 1 1 2 1 - - - - - - - - - = - t t t t t t d t d t s d s d a s d s d a s d s d S S S S S S .
Rewriting gives
( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) 2 1
1 1 2 1 1 - -
- - - - + + - = t t
d
t t d t td s d s d s d S S a
a
S . (18)







1 2 - - = .  It can be shown that28
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )






2 1 1 2 -
- - - -
- - - + + - - = - t d
d d d
t t t t d b t b td s d s s d s s d S a
a
a a S S .

































































t t L L . (19)
Now again let us consider the indifference equation (3) as  ( ) t t t t d q q d s s - = - - - 1 1 .
Summing it up from  2 = t  to  t = t  and rewriting gives
( ) ￿
- + - + =
t







d q q .
Taking the first differential w.r.t.  1 q  at  S q  and using (19), we get:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ). 1 1
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- - - - -
-
> + = + =
= - - + > - - + =
= - + - + =


















As  t q  and  t s  are differentiable at  S q q = 1  they can be written as follows:




























The above inequality implies that  ( ) ( )
0 0
1
0 , t S t U t U ˛ = $ q q  such that for all 
0
1 t U ˛ q






1 < - + - - < - - - - S S S
t
a t a S t o
d
ds
s q q q q q
q
q q q q , or
( ) ( ) 1 1 q e q q q g t S t s < - , where  1 2
1
- = a g e .
Now we will show that all induction assumptions are valid for  2 , 1 = t .  Let us first
consider the function  ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 1 1 , q q q h q q - = - = v p s .  In terms of the function  m  it can29











- = ￿ d
v
s .   ( ) 1 1 q s  is a continuous function over
( ) S S U q e q m,
0
0 - ”  and differentiable at  S q q = 1 .  From the definition of  a it follows
that  ( ) ( ) a
d
ds




 and  ( ) ( )( ) ( ) S S o a s q q q q q - + - - - = 1 1 1 1 1 .  Hence, there exists a






1 , 1 U U S ￿ = q q , such that for all 
0
1 1 U ˛ q   ( ) 0 1 1 > q s .
Obviously,  1 q  itself is continuous and differentiable at  S q q = 1 .  Then, using the
definitions of  t y  and  t z , we get  ( ) ( )





















( )( ) 0 1 2
1 1
1










Finally, using (13), (15) and (16) yields  ( )( )
( )( )( ) 0 2
1 2 1 1
1
1 2 < - =









consequently,  ( ) 0
1













.  That ends the proof of the
induction argument.
We finish the proof by showing that for some  0 T  we must have  ( ) S T q q q > 1 0 ,
hence, for all  0 T t >  and all 
0 0
1 0 T t U U ￿ ˛ q :  ( ) S t q q q > 1 .  To see this consider the













d .  The first term of this sequence equals 1.  Moreover, the
sequence is decreasing with strictly negative increment as
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )






















































, where  ( )( ) œ ß
ø
Œ º




d .  It implies that for all 
0
1 0 T U ˛ q   ( ) 1 0 q q q T S < . ¦30
Proof of Proposition 4.2.




￿ 1 ~ t  and our indifference equation (2) can be




1 - - - - - + = - + = t t d t t d t t q q q s p p .  Rewriting yields
( ) 1 1
1
1, - - - + = t t t t t s v q q q h d .
Function  ( ) t t t q q h , 1 -  strictly increases w.r.t.  t q  for all  1 - t q , so there exists an
inverse function which determines  t q  as a function of  ( ) 1 1 q q - t  and  ( ) 1 1 q - t s ,
( ) 1
1
1, - - = t t t t s d q q q .  This function is defined for all  1 q  as long as
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1
1
1 1 , q q q q q q h d - - - + ‡ t t t t s v .  Using (11) we can write:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1
, ,
, , , ,
- -
- -









q q m q q m
q q m q q h q q m q q h
, where  t t s d g
1 = .
Then
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )


























v y q q
q q















( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) S t t t
t
t
t t t t t g
tF
v y q q q g
q q m
g q q q h - + = - - - - -
-





where  g  and  t F  were defined in (9) and (6) correspondingly.  Then we get:










vy q q q g
q q m
g q
q q q h


















2 = - + - + - - -
-
- S t t t
t
t
t t t t g
tF
y K vy q q q g
q q m
j , (20)
where  t K  and  1 - t j  were defined in (5) and (10) correspondingly.
Now let us take any  0 > S e  and any  ( ) { } ( ) S q q e e g q - ˛ 2
1 , min , 0 .  Then we take a






















v , a small  0 1 > e  such that
( ) { } S S v q e e 1 , min 2
1
1 - < , and a large  T  such that31
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )



































g .  By the assumption of the
Proposition 4.2 for that T  there exist corresponding  ( ) ( ) S T T U q q ,
0
1
0 =  and  ( )
0
T T U Q .
Now let us take the subset  ( ) ( )
0 0
1
0 , ˆ ˆ
T S T U T U ￿ = q q  such that for all 
0
1 ˆ
T U ˛ q :




1 < + - s S ;
b)  q e q q < - S T ;
c)  ( ) ( )( ) 1 1 3
sup max 1
















q t K ;
d)  ( ) 1 1 e q j > T  (it is always possible as  ( ) ( ) 1 1 e q q j > - = S S T v ).
Now we will prove that if for all 
0
1 ˆ
T U ˛ q  and some  1 + ‡T t   ( ) 1 1 1 e q j > - t , then
there exist well-defined functions  ( ) 1 q qt  and  ( ) 1 q t s  such that  1 - - = t t t y q q  is
determined by (20) and  ( ) ( ) 0
1
1 1 > - > - e q d t t s s .
At first we prove the existence of  ( ) 1 q qt  showing that
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1
1
1 1 , q q q q q q h d - - - + ‡ t t t t s v  if  ( ) 0 1 1 ‡ - q jt  and  q e q q + < - S t 1 :
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )


















1 1 1 1




















= - ‡ - + = + -




- - - -







t t t t










v v v s v
q q m q q m
q q m q q q q
q q m q q m
q q m q q q q
q
q q m q q m
q q m q q h q q m q q h
q q q h q j q q h q q q h
m h m h
d
thus there exist  ( ) 1 q qt  and  ( ) 1 q t s  such that  1 - - = t t t y q q  is determined by (20).
Using the fact that for  1 + =T t   ( ) 1 1 1 e q j > - t  we can solve (20) w.r.t.  t y
9:









- + + + - = - - -
-
- -









y q q q g
j
q q m j
1 1 1 2
1




                                               
9  Another solution is always negative and doesn't satisfy 
1 - > t t q q .32
It can be shown that the expression under the square root above is positive and,
therefore,  t y  is uniquely defined by (21).
Now we will show that  ( ) e d - > -
1
1 t t s s .  Using the well-known inequality that for
all  0 > x   x x 2
1 1 1 + < +  we get:
( ) ( )( ) ( )










1 1 1 2
1
1 1
















- + + + - =
t t S t t t
t t
t


















q q q g
j
q q m
q q q g
j
q q m j
g
m






t t t t t t s s s y s s .
Now we will prove that  T TS > $ ,  ( ) ( )
0
1 ˆ , T S S
S S
T U T U
S ￿ = $ q q  and 
S T Q $  such that for
all  1 , , 1 - + = S T T t K  and for all 
S
TS U ˛ 1 q   ( ) 1
1
- - > t t s s e d ,  1 1 e j > - t  and  ( ) 1 1 1 e q j = -
S
TS .
Suppose not, then for all  1 + ‡T t  and for all 
0
1 ˆ
T U ˛ q   ( ) 1 1 1 e q j > - t .  But in this
case we have an induction: for all  1 + ‡T t   ( ) ( ) ( ) q q q q q , 1 1 1 - ˛ $ t t  and
( ) ( ) ( ) 0 1 1
1
1 > - > $ - q e q d t t s s .  Let fix any 
0
1 ˆ
T U ˛ q  and consider the following sequences
of numbers:  { }
¥
+ = 1 T t t q  and  { }
¥
+ = 1 T t t s .  The former increases and is bounded, so
q q q £ = $ ¥ ¥ ﬁ t tlim .  The later also increases and  +¥ = $
¥ ﬁ t t s lim  as
( ) ( )









- + = - > - > t v
v




d d e .
But if we take a limit of  1 - t j  we get a contradiction:




1 lim 1 1 lim lim t t t t t t t s v s v d d q q j ,
as  1 1 e j > - t  for all  1 + ‡T t .
So, it must be the case that  T TS > $ ,  ( ) S
S S
TS U q q , 1 = $  and 
S T Q $  such that for all
1 , , 1 - + = S T T t K  and for all 
S
TS U ˛ 1 q   ( ) 0 1
1 > - > - t t s s e d , 1 1 e j > - t  and  ( ) 1 1 1 e q j = -
S
TS .




t U t U 1 1 , - ￿ = $ q q  and
1 - Q ￿ Q $ t t  such that  ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 e q j = - t
S
t  and  ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1
1
1 q e q d - - > t t s s  for all 
S
t U ˛ 1 q .




t S U t U ￿ = $ q q , 1  and  t Q $  such that for all33
1 , , 1 - + = t T K t  and for all 
S
t U ˛ 1 q   ( ) 1 1 1 e q jt > - ,  ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 1 1
1
1 > - > - q e q t d t s s  and
( ) ( ) 1 1 1 e q j = - t
S
t .  It implies that
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
















1 1 1 1 1 1
S S S S
t S t t S t S t






v v v v v vy
vy v y v y t s t v
e e e q ed e
q ed e j q ed e edg e e
g q g q q q q
= + < - + <
< - + = - - + = + < + =
= + - - = - - - + = - -
- - - -
- - - -




t v s e q q q - - > 1 1 1 .
Summing up the indifference equation (3) in a form  ( ) t t t t d q q d s s - = - - - 1 1  from




t s s s s s
2 1 2 2 1 1 1
t t t t t t d d q q d , or
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) { } ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )















































































d t t d q
t t t t d q





q de e q e e q e e
e
q e
e j q e g e
e e d e e
e d d e
d d e






















￿ - - - + - - + <
< - - + - + =

























s s s T
s s s






















So,  q e q q < - S t  for all 
S
t U ˛ 1 q .
Finally, let us consider  ( ) ( ) t
S
t 1 q j :
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )


















e g d d e g d e d e
d g deg e g j








= - - + < - - + <
< - - + - + < - + - + =









t t t t t









y v y t s t v t
so  ( ) ( ) 1 1 e q j < t
S
t .  On the other hand  ( ) ( ) 1 1 e q q j > - = S S t v  and  ( ) 1 q jt  is continuous, so
( ) ( ) ( ) S
S S
t
S t U t q q q , 1 1 1 = ˛ + $  such that  ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 e q j = + t
S
t , that ends the induction.
But if  ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 e q j = + t
S




t t v t s e q q q - + - > + + + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  as




t U t U ￿ + = + q q , 1 1 1  so that  q e q q < - + S t 1  for all
S
t U 1 1 + ˛ q , that ends the proof. ¦34
Proof of Proposition 4.3.
In all previous analysis we were considering  t q  as a function of  1 q ,  ( ) 1 q q q t t = .  Now
we will consider  t q  as a function of  1 - t q  and  1 - t g ,  ( ) 1 1, - - = t t t t g q q q , where
( ) 1 1 1 q g g - - = t t  and  ( ) 1 1 1 q q q - - = t t .  We define the following limit function:
( ) ( ) 0 0 0 0 1 ˆ , ˆ lim ˆ , ˆ ˆ g q q g q q t tﬁ¥ = . (22)
In the same spirit as before we introduce functions  ( ) ( ) 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 ˆ ˆ , ˆ ˆ ˆ , ˆ ˆ q g q q g q - = y ,
( ) ( ) 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 ˆ , ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ , ˆ ˆ g q g g q y s - = ,  ( ) ( ) 0 0 1
1
0 0 1 ˆ , ˆ ˆ ˆ , ˆ ˆ g q g q g d s = ,  ( ) ( ) 0 0 0 0 0 ˆ ˆ 1 ˆ , ˆ ˆ g q g q j - - = v .
Taking the limit  (22) explicitly
10 yields that the limit actually exists for all
[ ) e q q q - ˛ , ˆ
0 S  and  ( ) ( ) e q q q h e g - - ˛ 0 0 0 ˆ , ˆ , ˆ v  where  0 > e  is an arbitrarily small
number.  Convergence is uniform, hence  ( ) 0 0 1 ˆ , ˆ ˆ g q q  is continuous and it follows that
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ￿
￿
￿
- - < £ - + =
- £ <
=
e q q q h g q g q q q h g q q
q g e q
g q q
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0
0 0 1 ˆ , ˆ ˆ ˆ 1   if   , ˆ ˆ ˆ , ˆ : ˆ , ˆ ˆ
ˆ 1 ˆ   if   , ˆ




Then we define  ( ) 0 0 1 ˆ , ˆ ˆ g q q  on a boundary where  0 ˆ0 = g ,  ( ) 0 0 0 ˆ , ˆ ˆ q q q h g - = v  or  q q = 0 ˆ
by taking corresponding limits of the function  ( ) 0 0 1 ˆ , ˆ ˆ g q q  when  0 + ﬁ e , that yields
( ) 0 0 1 ˆ 0 , ˆ ˆ q q q = ,  ( ) ( ) q q q q h q q = - 0 0 0 1 ˆ , ˆ , ˆ ˆ v  and  ( ) q g q q = 0 1 ˆ , ˆ 11.
Finally we define  ( ) 0 0 1 ˆ , ˆ ˆ g q q + t  for all  1 > t  as follows.  If for some  [ ] q q q , ˆ
0 S ˛ ,
[ ] 0
1
0 ˆ , 0 ˆ q g d
- ˛ v  and for all  t , , 0 K = t  there exist functions  ( ) 0 0 ˆ , ˆ ˆ g q qt  and  ( ) 0 0 ˆ , ˆ ˆ g q gt  such
that  ( ) t t t q q q h g ˆ , ˆ ˆ 0 - £ £ v  and  ( ) q g q qt £ 0 0 ˆ , ˆ ˆ  then we take  ( ) ( ) t t t g q q g q q ˆ , ˆ ˆ ˆ , ˆ ˆ
1 0 0 1 = + .
It can be easily seen that if  ( ) t t t q q q h g ˆ , ˆ ˆ 0 - < < v  and  ( ) q g q qt < 0 0 ˆ , ˆ ˆ  then
( ) 0 0 1 ˆ , ˆ ˆ g q q + t  has the following limit representation
12:
                                               





while the later does 




+ + ￿ y vK .  The final result then is straightforward.
11  The expression  ( ) 0 1 ˆ , ˆ g q q  is defined only if  0 ˆ0 ‡ j , i.e.,  ( ) 0 0 ˆ 1 ˆ q g - £ v .
12 If  ( ) 0 ˆ , ˆ ˆ 0 0 = g q gt ,  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 0 0 0 0 0 ˆ , ˆ ˆ , ˆ , ˆ ˆ ˆ , ˆ ˆ g q q q g q q h g q g t t t - =v  or  ( ) q g q qt = 0 0 ˆ , ˆ ˆ  for some  t  the function
( ) 0 0 1 ˆ , ˆ ˆ g q qt +  is not a limit function any more, but after all derivations have been made those functions will
never be evaluated at such points.35
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ lim ˆ , ˆ ˆ g q g g q q q g q q t t t t K K t t t t + + + + ¥ ﬁ + = .
The main use of that trick is to substitute complex functions
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) t t t t t - - - - - - t t t t t t g q g g q q q , , , 1 1 K K  by theirs limit analogs for very large  t when
the measure of "low quality goods" becomes negligible compare to the measure of
"high quality goods".  Limit functions  ( ) 0 0 ˆ , ˆ ˆ g q qt  would have been exactly the same as
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) t t t t t - - - - - - t t t t t t g q g g q q q , , , 1 1 K K  if there had been no entry of new sellers
13.
Now let us fix  ( ) k q q = 0 ˆ  and take any  ( ) ( )
k v q g d
1
0 , 0 ˆ - ˛ .  If for some  0 ‡ t  we have
obtained the functions  ( ) ( ) 0 0 0 ˆ ˆ ˆ , ˆ ˆ g q g q q t t =  and  ( ) ( ) 0 0 0 ˆ ˆ ˆ , ˆ ˆ g g g q g t t = , and at the same time
( ) t t t q q q h g ˆ , ˆ ˆ 0 - £ < v  then there exists the next function, namely
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 0 1 0 1 ˆ ˆ , ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ g g g q q g q t t t = +  such that  ( ) [ ] q q g q t t , ˆ ˆ ˆ
0 1 ˛ +  for all  ( ) ( )
k v q g d
1
0 , 0 ˆ - ˛ .
We will show that  0 ˆ ‡ $t  and  ( ) ( )
k v q g d
1 , 0 ˆ - ˛ $  such that either  ( ) 0 ˆ ˆˆ = g g t , or
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) g q q g q h g g ˆ ˆ , ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ t t t v - > .
Suppose not, that means that for any  0 ‡ t  and any  ( ) ( )
k v q g d
1
0 , 0 ˆ - ˛   ( ) 0 ˆ ˆ g qt $  and
( ) 0 ˆ ˆ g g t $  such that  ( ) t t t v q q q h g ˆ , ˆ ˆ 0 - £ <  and  ( ) q q q £ £ t
k ˆ .  Let fix any  ( ) ( )
k v q g d
1 , 0 ˆ - ˛
and get infinite sequences  ( ) { }
¥
=0 ˆ ˆ
t t g q  and  ( ) { }
¥
=0 ˆ ˆ t t g g .  The former is weakly increasing
and bounded so  q q q £ = $ ¥ ¥ ﬁ
ˆ ˆ lim t t .  But this implies that the later has a limit either
( ) { } ( ) ( ) 0 ˆ 1 ˆ ˆ , ˆ ˆ ˆ , ˆ lim ˆ lim 1 > - = - = - = ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ + ¥ ﬁ ¥ ﬁ q q q q h q q q h g v v v t t t t t t .  Taking a limit of the
indifference equation  ( ) t t t t q q g g d ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 1 - - = + +  gives rise to a contradiction:
( ) ( ) { } ( ) ¥ ¥ ﬁ + ¥ ﬁ + ¥ ﬁ ¥ - = = - - = = - q g q q g g d q d ˆ 1 ˆ lim ˆ ˆ ˆ lim ˆ lim ˆ 1 1 1 v v t t t t t t t t .
So, only two possibilities are left:
a)  Case 1.   tˆ $  and  ( ) ( )
k v q g d
1 , 0 ˆ - ˛ $  such that for all  1 ˆ , , 1 - = t t K  and all  ( ) g g ˆ , 0 ˆ0 ˛
0 ˆ > t g ,  ( ) 1 1 1 ˆ ˆ , ˆ
- - - + ‡ t t t v g q q q h ,  0 ˆˆ > t g  while  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) g g g q q g q h ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ , ˆ ˆ
1 ˆ 1 ˆ 1 ˆ - - - + < t t t v ; and
                                               
13  No entry case is described in Janssen and Roy (1999a).36
b)  Case 2.   tˆ $  and  ( ) ( )
k v q g d
1 , 0 ˆ - ˛ $  such that for all  t t ˆ , , 1K =  and all  ( ) g g ˆ , 0 ˆ0 ˛
0 ˆ > t g  and  ( ) 1 1 1 ˆ ˆ , ˆ
- - - + ‡ t t t v g q q q h  while  ( ) 0 ˆ ˆˆ = g g t .
The detailed proof of the Cases is on request.  We prove that in the Case 1
0 > $ S e  such that for any  T   T t > $ ,  ( ) ( ) S S t q e q q m,
~
1 - ˛ $  and  ( ) 1
~
q
t Q $  such that
( ) q q q = 1
~
t  and  ( ) S t s e q > 1
~
.  In other words in this case there exist infinite number
equilibrium sequences such that all goods are traded in the last period.





+ .  We show that  ( ) ( ) ( ] q q q ,
1 k k v ˛
+ .
Then we prove that either we have the same result as in the Case 1, or for any  0 > S e
and  0 > q e   ( ) ( ) k
S
k
S T T > $
+1  such that for all  ( ) 1 + >
k
S T t
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) k
t
k
t U k t k t U ￿ + + = $
+ 1 , , 1 , 1 1
1 q q  and  ( ) ( )
1 + Q $
k





( ) ( )




t ,  ( ) S t s e q < £ 1 0  and  ( ) ( ) ( ) S t t v s e q q q - - > 1 1 1 . ¦
Proof of Theorem 4.1.
Consequently applying Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 we get the following result: for any
0 > S e  and  0 > q e   S T $  such that for all  S T t ‡   ( ) ( ) S
S S
t t U q q , 1 = $  and  ( )
S
t t U Q $  such
that for any 
S




t v s e q q q - - > 1 1 1 .  Now we can
see that we are under the conditions of Proposition 4.3 if we take  ( ) q q q < = S
1 .  Here
we distinguish three cases.
a)  Case 1.  For any  ¥ = K , 1 k  there exists  ( ) ( ) ( ) q q q ,
1 k k v ˛
+  such that for any  0 > S e
and  0 > q e   ( ) 1 + $
k
S T  such that for all  ( ) 1 + >
k
S T t
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) k
t
k
t U k t k t U ￿ + + = $
+ 1 , , 1 , 1 1
1 q q  and  ( ) ( )
1 + Q $
k
t t U  such that:




t U q   ( ) ( )





•  ( ) ( ) S t k t s e q < + £ 1 , 0 1 ;
•  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) S t t k t v k t s e q q q - + - > + 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 .37
But in this case we get infinite sequence 
( ) { }
¥
=1 k
k q  where  ( ) ( ) k k vq q >
+1 , that
contradicts with  ( ) q q <
k  as  ( ) +¥ =
¥ ﬁ
k
k q lim .  So after some steps  k ˆ we must meet
either the Case 2 or Case 3.
b)  Case 2.  There exists  ( ) k ˆ
q  such that there does not exist  ( ) ( ) ( ] q q q , ˆ ˆ 1 k k v ˛
+ .  In
accordance with Proposition 4.3 we can make a conclusion:  0 > $ S e  such that for
any  T   T t > $ ,  ( ) t 1
~
q $  and  ( ) 1
~
q
t Q $  such that  ( ) q q q = 1
~
t  and  ( ) S t s e q > 1
~
.  In other
words there are infinite number of equilibrium sequences such that all goods are
sold in the last period and the last marginal surplus is strictly positive and
separated from zero,  ( ) 0
~
1 > > S t s e q .
In this case we can construct infinite number of dynamic equilibria by
concatenating equilibrium sequences, e.g. we take  { }
t
t 1 = = Q t t q  and let a dynamic
equilibrium be the following sequence of marginal sellers:  { }
¥
=1 t t q  such that
t t q q =  if  t £ t    and  t - = t t q q  if  t > t   .
c)  Case 3.  There exists  ( ) k ˆ
q  such that there exists  ( ) q q =
+1 ˆ k .
Note here that  ( ) 1 ˆ + k q  is determined in terms of the previous point  ( ) k ˆ
q , the measure
function  ( ) q m  and parameters  q ,  v and  d .  In other words
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) d q q m q q , , , , ˆ ˆ 1 v
k k W =
+ , where  ( ) ( ) ( ) d q q m q , , , , ˆ v
k W  is some operator.
Therefore the case when  ( ) ( ) ( ) q d q q m q = W , , , , ˆ v
k  is non-generic. ¦
Proof of Proposition 4.4.
We begin with solving the system of indifference equations (4) w.r.t.  t p :














p ,  1 , , 1 - = t K t . (23)38
We will look for such a sequence of functions  ( ) { }
t
1 1 = t t q q  satisfying (4) that  t t q q < +1










































Hence, we can write  ( ) 1 q qt  and  ( ) 1 q t s as  ( ) ( )( ) ( ) S S S S o
d
d





t - + - - = 1 1
1
1
and  ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) S S S o
d
d





t - + - - - = 1 1
1




( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )( )




























q q q q
d d d
d d








t t t t t t
- + -
- - - -
- - - -
- =

























qt .  Thus there exists a neighborhood,




1 - = - , such that for all 
0
1 1 - ˛ t U q   S q qt <  and, therefore,  t t q q < +1 ,






t t q q  such that all
conditions to be proved are satisfied except the last one and we only have to show that





0 , - ˛ = t S t U t U q q such that for all
0
1 t U ˛ q   ( ) ( ) 1
1
1 0 q e q q q d g t S t s < - < .
Given the structure of  ( ) { }
t
1 1 = t t q q  we can write:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
































q q q m q q q m
m q m q


























































































q q q q
Substituting this into the first differential of (4) yields39

















































q q q q q
q
q
q q - + - + = 1 1
1
.





0 , - ˛ = t S t U t U q q , such that for
all 
0























































































so if  ( )











a  and  ( )
2 1 d - £ a  is a sufficient condition.
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 when  a t
1 > .
So there exists  [ ] 1
1
0 + = a T  such that for all  0 T t >   ( )
0 0
1











t t U  such that for all 
0
1 t U ˛ q   ( ) S t q q q > 1 ,  ( ) 0 1 > q t s .   ( ) S S q q qt =  and  ( ) 0 = S s q t
for all  t , , 1K = t  by construction.
Finally we will prove that if  t is taken sufficiently large than  0 > $ g e  such that
( ) ( ) 1
1
1 0 q e q q q d g t S t s < - < .40
Let us consider the ratio  ( )





1 .  It can be written as
( )
( )
( )( ) ( )
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.
This implies that we actually can take any  0 > g e  such that  0 0 T T > $  such that for
all  0 T t >   ( ) ( ) S t t U q q ,
0
1
0 = $  and  ( )
0 2
t t U Q $  such that  ( ) ( ) 1
1
1 0 q e q q q d g t S t s < - < . ¦
Proof of Proposition 4.5.
Suppose we have obtained an equilibrium sequence  ( )
0





such that for all  1 , , 1 k K = t   t q  and  t s  can be represented as
( )( ) ( ) S S S S o
d
d





t - + - + = 1 1
1
, and  ( )( ) ( ) S S S o
d
ds
s q q q q q
q
t


















, and for all 
0
1 1 k U ˛ q   ( ) ( ) S k q q q q qt < < 1 1 1 .
We introduce the following new variable:




































In terms of 
1 k a , surplus 
1 k s  can be represented as  ( ) ( ) ( ) S k S k k k o s q q q q a q - + - =
1 1 1 1 1 .
There exists at least one of such a sequence, namely { } 1 q , where  1 1 = k .
Now we will construct a new equilibrium sequence  ( )
1 k t Q Q  in the following way.
We will repeat the whole structure of 
1 k Q   t times.  In other words, for all
1 , , 1 - = t K t  and for all  1 , , 1 1 - = k l K  we put  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 q q q q t t l k l k + - + + - <  if
( ) ( ) 1 1 1 q q q q l l < +  and vice versa.  Another rule is that for all  t , , 2 K = t
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 1 q q q q t t k k - < .41
Having done this we can see that each of the sequences  ( ) { } ( )
1






+ - =  for all
t , , 1K = t  is an equilibrium sequence 
1 k Q .  Now we have to find  ( ) 1 1 1 q q + tk  such that










k p p t t t
t q d q d - = - +
- , in other words, the seller of
quality 
1 k t q  must be indifferent between selling in time period  1 k t  and  1 1 + tk .  Loosely
speaking we try to construct a sort of equilibrium sequence of type II using 
1 k Q  as
single components instead of  t q .
We will show that if  d a >























ak  then it can be done for





- >  then  0 1 1 > + tk s .  Applying the same procedure as in the proof of the
Proposition 4.4 we get the following indifference equations:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )











k p p q d q d d t
t
t
t + - + - - + - = - - . (25)
Taking the first differentials of (25) at  S q qt =  and using definition of 
1 k a  (24) we get:
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k S
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k S k k S
k t
k S k
k d d d d q d q a q d q a d t
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t + - + - - + - = + - .
Using the fact that 
1 1 k k a at =  yields 
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.  Hence, we can write  ( ) 1 1 q qtk  and  ( ) 1 1 q tk s  as:
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qt  as long as  d a >
1 k
14.  Thus there






1 1 , k S tk U tk U ￿ = q q , such that for all 
0
1 1 tk U ˛ q
S k q qt <
1  and, therefore,  ( ) 1 1 1 k k t t q q < + , and  0
1 > k st .  Therefore there exists a system of






= q q  which satisfies all the indifference equations (25) such that all
conditions of  ( )
1 k t Q Q  are satisfied except the last one and now we have to find
( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 1 q q q q tk tk ‡ +  such that  ( ) 0 1 1 1 > + q tk s .






= q q  we can write:
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Substituting this into the first differential of (25) yields
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1 1 1 , 1 tk S tk U tk U ˛ + = + q q , such















































actually is a sufficient one.  Now we will check whether  0 1 1 > + tk s :
                                               
14  Note that this condition is trivially satisfied for  1 = t .43
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Now we will construct the desired equilibrium sequence Q  and our objective is to
get 























m ak .  We start from  1 1 = k  and  1 1 Q = Qk .
Suppose that  d a £
1 k  and we cannot take  1 > t .  In this case we take  1 = t , in other
words we look for 
1 1 1 k k q q > + .  It follows that
































and  S k q q < +1 1 , hence  0 1 1 > + k s , in some left neighborhood of  S q .  We take
( )
1 2 1 k k Q Q ” Q , where  1 1 2 + = k k , as an initial equilibrium sequence and repeat the
described procedure again.
Now we will prove that after some  n steps we get  d a >
n k .  To do so we take a
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But this implies that  +¥ =
¥ ﬁ n k n a lim  that contradicts with  d a £
n k .








t t q q 1 1  and
d a >
n k .

















































 we will show that it is possible to find  n t  such that in
equilibrium sequence  ( )
n n n k k Q Q = Q
+ t 1  we get  S kn n q qt < +1 .













 then  ( )
n n k k Q Q = Q
+ 1 1  and  S kn q q < +1  in some











































































































































































have for  ( )
n n n k k Q Q = Q
+ t 1 :
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In other words,  S k k k n n n n q q q q t < = < + + 1 1  and  0 1 1 > = + + n n n k k s s t , and we can continue with
( )
n n n k k Q Q = Q
+ t 1 .45

















































.  Then we can evaluate
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So, for all large n  d a > >1
n k , and, therefore
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Then, it follows that  1 lim „
¥ ﬁ n
n t  because otherwise we would have  1 = n t  for all
large n and, consequently,















































































































































































































So,  1 lim „
¥ ﬁ n
n t  and there exists a subsequence  l n  such that  ¥ ﬁ
ﬁ¥ l
l n  and  2 ‡
l n t .










































































































































































Using the inequality (26) we get:
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1 m tk t U  such that for all 
0
1 1 + ˛
m tk U q47
( ) S tkm q q q > + 1 1 ,  ( ) 0 1 1 > + q
m tk s .   ( ) S S q q qt =  and  ( ) 0 = S s q t  for all  1 , , 1 + = m tk K t  by
construction.
Finally we will prove that if  t is taken sufficiently large than  0 > $ g e  such that
( ) ( ) 1 1
1
1 1 q e q q q d g + + < -
m m tk S tk s .  Let us consider the ratio  ( )
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This implies that we actually can take any  0 > g e  such that  0 0 T T > $  such that for
all  0 T t >   ( ) ( ) S m tk tk U




1 + = $ +  and  ( )
0
1 1 + + Q $
m m tk tk U  such that for all 
0
1 1 + ˛
m tk U q
1
1
1 0 + + < - <
m m tk S tk s d g e q q . ¦